Analyzing socio-environmental conflicts with a commonsian transactional framework: Application to a mining conflict in Peru

Romuald Dupuy, Philippe Roman, Benoît Mougenot

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículoInvestigaciónrevisión exhaustiva

7 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

© 2015, Journal of Economic Issues / Association for Evolutionary Economics. Socio-environmental conflicts are widespread, and global economic growth will likely increase them in the coming decades. While political ecology, the analysis of common pool resources, and ecological economics, among others, have provided praiseworthy insights into such conflicts, institutional approaches to these phenomena are still scarce. Classical institutional economics has occasionally been put to work on environmental issues, but proposed frameworks remain relatively underdeveloped. We wish to contribute to institutional research on environmental issues by building upon Bruno Thérets interpretation of John R. Commonss transactional model and applying the framework to a case of socio-environmental conflicts. First, we briefly sketch the landscape of institutional contributions (especially those that follow the classical institutionalist tradition) to the analysis of environmental issues. We explain why Commons has largely been ignored on these issues. Then, we analyze some of the key concepts of Commonsian economics that are of particular interest to our theoretical elaboration. Following this, we depict Commonss transactional scheme and propose an application to a case of socioenvironmental mining conflict in Peru. Our framework could complement existing ones and shed light on the institutional dynamics of natural-resource management through conflict.
Idioma originalInglés estadounidense
Páginas (desde-hasta)895-921
Número de páginas27
PublicaciónJournal of Economic Issues
DOI
EstadoPublicada - 2 oct 2015
Publicado de forma externa

Huella dactilar

Environmental conflict
Peru
Environmental issues
Economics
Evolutionary economics
Resource economics
Institutional economics
Economic growth
Political ecology
Common pool resources
Ecological economics
Elaboration
Natural resource management

Citar esto

@article{443bd1758d3c4508aeec884594f3154a,
title = "Analyzing socio-environmental conflicts with a commonsian transactional framework: Application to a mining conflict in Peru",
abstract = "{\circledC} 2015, Journal of Economic Issues / Association for Evolutionary Economics. Socio-environmental conflicts are widespread, and global economic growth will likely increase them in the coming decades. While political ecology, the analysis of common pool resources, and ecological economics, among others, have provided praiseworthy insights into such conflicts, institutional approaches to these phenomena are still scarce. Classical institutional economics has occasionally been put to work on environmental issues, but proposed frameworks remain relatively underdeveloped. We wish to contribute to institutional research on environmental issues by building upon Bruno Th{\'e}rets interpretation of John R. Commonss transactional model and applying the framework to a case of socio-environmental conflicts. First, we briefly sketch the landscape of institutional contributions (especially those that follow the classical institutionalist tradition) to the analysis of environmental issues. We explain why Commons has largely been ignored on these issues. Then, we analyze some of the key concepts of Commonsian economics that are of particular interest to our theoretical elaboration. Following this, we depict Commonss transactional scheme and propose an application to a case of socioenvironmental mining conflict in Peru. Our framework could complement existing ones and shed light on the institutional dynamics of natural-resource management through conflict.",
author = "Romuald Dupuy and Philippe Roman and Beno{\^i}t Mougenot",
year = "2015",
month = "10",
day = "2",
doi = "10.1080/00213624.2015.1106200",
language = "American English",
pages = "895--921",
journal = "Journal of Economic Issues",
issn = "0021-3624",
publisher = "Taylor & Francis",

}

Analyzing socio-environmental conflicts with a commonsian transactional framework: Application to a mining conflict in Peru. / Dupuy, Romuald; Roman, Philippe; Mougenot, Benoît.

En: Journal of Economic Issues, 02.10.2015, p. 895-921.

Resultado de la investigación: Contribución a una revistaArtículoInvestigaciónrevisión exhaustiva

TY - JOUR

T1 - Analyzing socio-environmental conflicts with a commonsian transactional framework: Application to a mining conflict in Peru

AU - Dupuy, Romuald

AU - Roman, Philippe

AU - Mougenot, Benoît

PY - 2015/10/2

Y1 - 2015/10/2

N2 - © 2015, Journal of Economic Issues / Association for Evolutionary Economics. Socio-environmental conflicts are widespread, and global economic growth will likely increase them in the coming decades. While political ecology, the analysis of common pool resources, and ecological economics, among others, have provided praiseworthy insights into such conflicts, institutional approaches to these phenomena are still scarce. Classical institutional economics has occasionally been put to work on environmental issues, but proposed frameworks remain relatively underdeveloped. We wish to contribute to institutional research on environmental issues by building upon Bruno Thérets interpretation of John R. Commonss transactional model and applying the framework to a case of socio-environmental conflicts. First, we briefly sketch the landscape of institutional contributions (especially those that follow the classical institutionalist tradition) to the analysis of environmental issues. We explain why Commons has largely been ignored on these issues. Then, we analyze some of the key concepts of Commonsian economics that are of particular interest to our theoretical elaboration. Following this, we depict Commonss transactional scheme and propose an application to a case of socioenvironmental mining conflict in Peru. Our framework could complement existing ones and shed light on the institutional dynamics of natural-resource management through conflict.

AB - © 2015, Journal of Economic Issues / Association for Evolutionary Economics. Socio-environmental conflicts are widespread, and global economic growth will likely increase them in the coming decades. While political ecology, the analysis of common pool resources, and ecological economics, among others, have provided praiseworthy insights into such conflicts, institutional approaches to these phenomena are still scarce. Classical institutional economics has occasionally been put to work on environmental issues, but proposed frameworks remain relatively underdeveloped. We wish to contribute to institutional research on environmental issues by building upon Bruno Thérets interpretation of John R. Commonss transactional model and applying the framework to a case of socio-environmental conflicts. First, we briefly sketch the landscape of institutional contributions (especially those that follow the classical institutionalist tradition) to the analysis of environmental issues. We explain why Commons has largely been ignored on these issues. Then, we analyze some of the key concepts of Commonsian economics that are of particular interest to our theoretical elaboration. Following this, we depict Commonss transactional scheme and propose an application to a case of socioenvironmental mining conflict in Peru. Our framework could complement existing ones and shed light on the institutional dynamics of natural-resource management through conflict.

UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84949547122&origin=inward

UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.uri?partnerID=HzOxMe3b&scp=84949547122&origin=inward

U2 - 10.1080/00213624.2015.1106200

DO - 10.1080/00213624.2015.1106200

M3 - Article

SP - 895

EP - 921

JO - Journal of Economic Issues

JF - Journal of Economic Issues

SN - 0021-3624

ER -